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The debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has
galvanized controversy over the relation between international trade and environ-
mental protection. The ultimate resolution of environmental issues in the NAFTA
and "parallel-track" agreements will set an important precedent for the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other bilateral or regional trade
agreements. The NAFTA's evolution to date represents considerable progress in
accommodating trade objectives and environmental protection goals.
I. Background
Economists have been studying the effects of environmental regulation of inter-
national trade and competition for over fifteen years.' But the issue did not achieve
high political visibility until the initiation of the NAFTA negotiations and a coinci-
dental decision by a GATT panel invalidating a U.S. ban on imports of tuna caught
by Mexican boats that had not complied with U.S. restrictions on the incidental
take of dolphins. 2 The prospect of a free trade agreement with a neighbor that was
far less economically developed than the United States and had far less stringent
environmental standards and enforcement,3 together with the environmental prob-
lems created by industrial development and urbanization in the maquiladora free
trade border area, rang alarm bells in the U.S. environmental community.
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1. See Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature, in 159 WORLD
BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Patrick Low ed., 1992)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK].
2. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Panel Report].
3. One measure of enforcement levels is the funding for enforcement efforts. In 1991, the U.S.
per capita budget of the Environmental Protection Agency was $24.40; the Mexican per capita budget
of the Mexican environmental agency (formerly SEDUE, now SEDESOL), was $.48. Juanita Darling,
Larry B. Stammer & Judy Pasternak, Can Mexico Really Clean Up Its Act?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1991, at AI, A19. The Mexican figure in 1989, however, was only $.08. Id.
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Environmentalists feared that a free trade regime would cause industries to
migrate from the United States to Mexico, attracted in part by Mexico's less
demanding environmental standards. Such migration would accelerate environ-
mental degradation in Mexico and the border area, lead to increased transboundary
spillovers of pollution from Mexico into the United States, and fuel demands
for relaxation of U.S. environmental standards. Environmentalists were also
concerned that a free trade agreement would lead to an influx from Mexico of
fruits, vegetables, and other farm products with high pesticide residues; a weaken-
ing of U.S. federal and state food, plant, and product standards; and evisceration
of U.S. efforts to bar imports of goods, such as Mexican-caught tuna, because
of the environmental harm caused by their means of production.
Accordingly, environmental groups demanded that the NAFTA contain envi-
ronmental protection measures, including assurances that U.S. product standards
would not be compromised and requirements that Mexican environmental stan-
dards would be upgraded and enforced. Those groups also proposed that the U.S.
Government retain authority to impose tariffs or other trade sanctions against
Mexican imports produced by processes that do not meet U.S. environmental
standards; that Mexican plants of U.S. companies be required to meet U.S.
environmental standards; that the United States and Mexico undertake extensive
measures to clean up and protect the border environment; and that a tariff be
imposed on Mexican imports to fund enhanced environmental protection efforts
in Mexico. Environmental groups also unsuccessfully sued the Office of the
United States Trade Representative to require that it prepare an environmental
impact statement prior to reaching agreement on the NAFTA.4
The Bush administration and other supporters of trade liberalization initially
opposed most of the environmentalists' proposals. Adding environmental issues
to the agenda would multiply points of conflict and make it more difficult to reach
agreement. Some of the proposed measures, such as the imposition of tariffs,
would contradict the basic objectives of trade liberalization. Moreover, the trade
community has long perceived that environmental issues are distinct from trade
issues and should be addressed through other means in other forums. For example,
until recently the GATT largely ignored environmental issues, with the exception
of efforts to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary standards and some product
standards. 5
4. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). In response to environmental concerns, the Office of the Trade Representative in February
1992 published an Environmental Review of the NAFTA, analyzing the impacts of trade liberalization
on the environment and identifying environmental issues relevant to prenegotiations.
5. Other types of environmental controversies have arisen under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement. See, e.g., Lobsters from Canada, USA 89-1807-01, 1990 WL 299945 (U.S.-Can. F.T.A.
Binational Panel May 25, 1990) (U.S. ban on imports of "undersized" Canadian lobsters upheld by
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Panel); Nancy Dunne & Bernard Simon, Canada-U.S. Beer
War's Green Tinge, Environmental Issues Creeping into an Old Dispute, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 1992,
at 4.
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Environmentalists, however, aided by an alliance of convenience with labor
union interests fearing job flight to Mexico and industries vulnerable to import
competition, succeeded in bringing strong political pressure to bear. Congress
refused to grant fast-track authority to the President unless the administration
agreed to address environmental issues in the NAFTA agreement itself or through
a "parallel track" of side agreements and measures. The NAFTA agreement
itself addresses concerns that U.S. regulation of food, plant, animal, and product
risks would be compromised. Pollution and other problems generated by industrial
pollution, the border area, and enforcement issues are being addressed through
negotiations on parallel-track agreements. The Bush administration and the Mexi-
can Government entered into cooperative agreements to deal with border problems
and to upgrade standards and enforcement in Mexico. The Mexican Government
has also sharply increased funding for environmental administration and initiated
some widely publicized enforcement initiatives. 6 The Bush administration suc-
cessfully resisted proposals for tariffs to fund environmental protection, and for
the imposition of sanctions on Mexico for assertedly inadequate environmental
protection efforts. Congress, however, has yet to approve the NAFTA. The
position of the new administration and Congress on the NAFTA-related environ-
mental issues and their linkage to trade liberalization is not settled, although it
appears that these issues will be resolved through parallel-track side agreements
rather than modification of the NAFTA text.
Before undertaking a more detailed discussion of the NAFTA's treatment of
environmental issues, it will be useful to develop a conceptual structure for
analyzing the relations between trade, environmental regulation, and competitive-
ness. The structure has three parts: the overall relation between trade liberalization
and environmental degradation; the relation between trade and environmental
regulation of products; and the relation between trade and regulation of pollution
and other environmental risks generated by industrial and natural resource produc-
tion methods.
II. The Overall Relation Between Economic
Growth and Environmental Protection
Some environmental advocates assert that economic growth inevitably causes
increased environmental degradation. Because economic growth is both the objec-
tive and the result of trade liberalization, these advocates strongly oppose trade
liberalization. They point to the severe pollution and other environmental prob-
lems of the maquiladora area as evidence that trade liberalization causes environ-
mental degradation. Former EPA Administrator William Reilly and other propo-
nents of the NAFTA have argued to the contrary. Taking Mexico as an example,
6. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 134-43 (1992).
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they contend that the investment spurred by trade liberalization would replace
older, resource-inefficient facilities with new state-of-the-art plants that pollute
less. They also argue that economic growth, by satisfying basic needs, will lead
the public to demand higher levels of environmental protection.7
Empirical studies by economists provide some support for those who argue
that trade liberalization does not lead to environmental degradation. As nations
initially shift from agriculture to industrialization, the amount of pollution per
unit of output rises; total pollution therefore increases faster than gross domestic
product (GDP). But once industrialization has reached a certain level, the amount
of pollution per unit of output declines. This phenomenon in part reflects a shift
in the sectoral composition of output. In the postindustrializing phase of develop-
ment, new investment shifts from highly polluting heavy industry to less polluting
high-tech and light industry and services.' Studies of developing countries, includ-
ing Mexico, also indicate an income effect: as citizens become more wealthy as
a result of economic growth, they demand higher levels of environmental quality. 9
Trade liberalization between developed and developing countries introduces an-
other factor. The comparative advantage of developing countries like Mexico
often lies in labor-intensive industry and agriculture; trade liberalization may
therefore shift development into these relatively less polluting sectors. Studies
have also shown that developing countries with liberal trade regimes have less
pollution in relation to output than countries with closed economies.o
These trends, however, do not ensure that the environment will eventually
become cleaner as a result of trade liberalization and economic development.
While postindustrializing shifts in the sectional composition of economic output,
higher incomes, and trade liberalization may reduce the rate of increase in pollu-
tion associated with increased GDP, the total amount of pollution may continue
to grow. Reversing the growth of pollution and other forms of environmental
degradation will require governments to adopt regulatory and other policies to
achieve that objective. No political economic trickle down law guarantees that
economic growth will automatically produce industrial patterns or governmental
policies that will improve environmental quality.
Most mainstream environmentalists, however, do not oppose economic growth
as such. They believe instead that trade liberalization and other measures to
promote growth should be conditioned upon or harnessed to promote environmen-
7. See William K. Reilly, Address Before the National Association of Manufacturers (Aug. 11,
1992).
8. See Robert E.B. Lucas, David Wheeler & Hermanala Hettige, Economic Development,
Environmental Regulation, and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 1960-1988,
in WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 67.
9. See id.; Gene Grossman & Alan Kruger, Environmental Effects of a North American Free
Trade Agreement (Feb. 1992) (unpublished discussion paper in economics, Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University).
10. See Nancy Birdsall & David Wheeler, Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin America:
Where Are the Pollution Havens?, in WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 159; Lucas, supra note 8.
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tally protective measures. For this reason the anti-NAFTA alliance between envi-
ronmental groups on the one hand and labor unions and domestic U.S. industries
vulnerable to import competition on the other was an alliance of convenience.
The ultimate objective of the labor and industry participants was to defeat the
NAFTA, or at least minimize the trade liberalization that it would secure. The
objective of mainstream environmentalists was not to defeat the agreement but
to reform the NAFTA to promote environmental protection.
HI. Product Regulation
Environmental, health, and safety regulation of products can obstruct trade in
several ways." Even where countries apply the same standards to imported and
domestic products, domestic producers are often better able to cope with such
requirements because they are more familiar with their own legal and regulatory
systems. Moreover, domestic producers generally enjoy a larger share of the
domestic market and are thus better able to achieve scale economies in complying
with domestic regulatory standards. Further, these standards may have the pur-
pose or effect of preferring and protecting domestic producers. For example,
requirements for recycling beverage containers or other packaging disadvantage
foreign producers who must incur either extra transportation costs if they recycle
in their own country, or logistical and scale disadvantages if they attempt to
recycle within the importing country.' 2 U.S. exporters have attacked Mexico's
requirement that U.S. swine be vaccinated for swine flu as unjustified protection-
ism, while Mexico has made similar charges against U.S. requirements that
Mexican limes be treated for citrus canker. Even in the absence of protectionism,
the adoption of different product standards by different countries creates added
transaction costs and scale diseconomies for producers in all nations.
A logical response to these problems is to harmonize the product standards
imposed by different nations. Efforts to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary
standards have proceeded under the auspices of the GATT. Product standard
harmonization also has proceeded at the regional and bilateral levels, as exempli-
fied by product legislation by the European Community and agreements between
the United States and Japan and the United States and the European Community
to harmonize standards relating to chemical testing and labeling. Three types of
difficulties impede these efforts. First, nations may differ on the appropriate
formulation of standards. For example, what tests should be used to determine
chemical toxicity, and what information should be provided in chemical labels?
11. The regulation of waste and natural resources presents somewhat different considerations
than regulation of products. See Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment, Lessons
from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329, 1351-53 (1992).
12. See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark 6 E.C.R. 67, 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1989) (upholding
in major part Denmark's requirement for recycling beverage containers despite adverse competitive
effects on German beer producers selling in Denmark).
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Second, product standards may differ because of differences in pertinent local
circumstances. For example, Mexico lacks some pesticide residue standards that
the United States has implemented, and the reverse is also true. These differences
are due in part to differences in crops and local growing conditions.13 Third, and
most fundamentally, countries disagree about the appropriate level of environ-
mental, health, and safety protection. Such differences may reflect disagreement
over the extent of risk posed by a product and disagreement over the appropriate
level of risk that society ought to tolerate. Differences over the appropriate level
of risk are likely to be most marked between developed and developing nations
because of differences in wealth and the relative priority accorded environmental
goals.
IV. Process Regulatory Standards
Environmental regulation of industrial and natural resource processes presents
trade-related considerations quite different from those presented by product regu-
lation. Assume that process standards in country A are less stringent than those
in country B. This disparity may concern B for several reasons. The pollution
generated by A's processes may spill over to B or may despoil the global commons.
Even if the adverse effects are confined to A, B's citizens may be concerned about
the degradation of A's environment. For example, the destruction of tropical
rain forests in some developing countries concerns many people in developed
countries. Finally, B's producers may suffer a competitive disadvantage because
their regulatory compliance costs are greater than those faced by producers in
A. This cost differential will disadvantage B's producers in both domestic and
international markets and may cause industry to migrate to A.
In a situation where A's product regulatory standards are less stringent than
B's, B can bar the import of such products for failure to meet its domestic stan-
dards, thereby protecting its citizens against the greater risks associated with A's
products and also protecting its producers against the cost advantage enjoyed by
A's producers. No comparable direct remedy is available to B to deal with either
the environmental degradation or the competitive disadvantages attributable to
A's less stringent process standards. B might ban products manufactured in A by
such processes or impose tariffs equal to the cost advantage enjoyed by A's
producers, but such efforts have little precedent. Moreover, the reasoning of the
GATT panel in the Tuna/Dolphin case and of a subsequent GATT report on
trade and the environment would lead one to conclude that all such unilateral
process-based trade restrictions are GATT-illegal. l4 Even if enforced, such unilat-
eral restrictions would not eliminate the competitive advantage enjoyed by A's
13. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PESTICIDES: REVIEW OF U.S. AND MEXICAN PESTI-
CIDE STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT (1992).
14. See Panel Report, supra note 3, at 40-42, 46-49; GATT SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1992).
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producers in other markets. Another remedy would be for B to negotiate with A
to adopt common process standards, although A may be reluctant to adopt B's
more stringent standards, and B may be reluctant to lower its own standards. '
5
Concerns about the competitive effects of differences in nations' process stan-
dards have been central to the debates over the NAFTA and the relation between
trade and the environment. For example, President Clinton has asserted that
Mexico must tighten its environmental standards "so we don't have people run-
ning down there so they can evade all Clean Air Act" requirements.' 6 The actual
extent of competitive disadvantage created by different national process standards,
however, is unclear. The costs of complying with environmental process regula-
tions are a relatively small portion of total production costs for most industries-
less than 1 percent on average for all industry and about 3 percent for the most
intensively regulated industries. Economic studies of productivity differences
among nations, trade patterns, and industrial location do not show that differences
in compliance costs are a significant factor in competitiveness, except for a few
intensively regulated or highly mobile industries. 7 The available evidence regard-
ing the effect of differences in U.S. and Mexican environmental standards points
to the same conclusion.1 8 Such studies, however, suffer from important limita-
tions, and the potential significance for competitiveness of different national
process standards cannot be dismissed.' 9
Even if different process standards do have competitiveness effects, it does not
follow that such differences are inappropriate. Economists reason that nations
differ in their capacity to assimilate pollution and other forms of environmental
degradation. They attribute these differences to factors such as size, geography,
15. Other potential remedies would be for B to grant its producers a subsidy or to require
B companies operating in A to comply with B's standards. Both of these remedies have obvious
limitations.
16. Clinton Endorses NAFTA But Says Pact Needs to Be Strengthened, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA)
(Feb. 22, 1993).
17. See H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD PRODUCT:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
(1988); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 1993). See also the studies discussed in Dean, supra note 1.
18. See Grossman & Kruger, supra note 9, at 20-28; M. Delal Baer, North American Free Trade,
FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991, at 132, 142 (1991). A GAO study found that furniture finishing plants in
Southern California relocated to Mexico in part because of differences in the stringency of environmen-
tal controls, but the plants that relocated represented only a small fraction of the total U.S. furniture
finishing industry capacity. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MExIco FREE TRADE:
SEVERAL U.S. WOOD FINISHING FIRMS RELOCATED FROM Los ANGELES AREA TO MEXICO (April
1991). However, a recent study found that 10 percent of U.S. firms that had relocated to the maquila-
dora region reported that U.S. environmental regulations were a primary factor in their decision to
relocate, and 17 percent considered them an important factor. Almost 13 percent said that weaker
environmental controls in Mexico were a primary factor in their decision to relocate there, and
13 percent said that lax Mexican enforcement was an important factor. See Roberto A. Sanchez,
Environment: The Mexican Perspective, in U.S.-MEXICAN INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION 303, 310 n. 19
(Sidney Weintraub ed., 1991).
19. See Stewart, supra note 17.
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population density, extent and nature of existing economic development and
pollution, wealth, and the social value placed on environmental quality. Nations
with a higher assimilative capacity can be expected to have less stringent environ-
mental standards. To the extent that their industries enjoy a competitive edge, that
edge, and any tendency of industry to migrate to such nations, appropriately
reflects comparative national advantage. 0 On this view, it is understandable that
developing countries may regard efforts by developed countries to impose higher
environmental standards on them as disguised protectionism or a form of eco-imp-
erialism.21
This economic analysis, however, assumes that governments adopt appropriate
environmental standards. But governmental incompetence or corruption, or the
political dominance of development-oriented interests, may result in adoption of
inappropriately lax standards. Unduly low standards may also be adopted because
of external effects. Pollution generated by one nation may dirty another's environ-
ment or despoil the global commons. Even where adverse physical effects, such
as species destruction, are confined to the country that causes them, the welfare of
those in other nations may suffer. Because the nation where such harms originate is
unlikely to pay much attention to the interests of those outside its borders, that
nation is likely to adopt standards that are too low. In addition, where the global
commons is despoiled, a "Tragedy of the Commons" dynamic may result in
unduly low standards in all countries.22
These circumstances often justify at least partial harmonization through bilat-
eral or multilateral agreement of process standards among different nations. Suc-
cessful examples of this approach include agreements dealing with endangered
species,23 hazardous waste shipments,24 and depletion of stratospheric ozone due
to emissions of CFCs and other chemicals.25 Significantly, these agreements,
unlike many efforts to harmonize product standards, have not been negotiated in
a trade forum such as the GATT, but under other auspices such as the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the United Nations Envi-
ronment Program, or the Council of Europe. The U.S.-Canada agreement on
reducing acid air pollution was negotiated separately from the U.S.-Canada Free
20. See Leonard, supra note 17; Martin C. McGuire, Regulation, Factor Rewards and Interna-
tional Trade, 17 J. Pun. EcON. 335 (1982).
21. See Peggy Rodgers, Note, Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: The World Bank and Environ-
mental Accounting, 3 GA. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 457, 476 (1990).
22. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
23. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar.
3, 1973, 27 T.I.A.S. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
24. United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Con-
vention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of
Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649, 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
25. United Nations: Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541, 1550-60 (1987) amended by Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537
(1991) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
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Trade Agreement. To some extent this pattern reflects the fact that trade organiza-
tions such as the GATT are unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the issues raised by
environmental process standards, which are more peripheral to trade liberalization
concerns than product standards. Moreover, trade professionals instinctively op-
pose harmonizing measures designed to eradicate national differences in compara-
tive advantage. For their part, environmentalists recognize that environmental
and trade considerations must ultimately be accommodated, but they distrust the
GATT and other trade forums as hostile or at best indifferent to environmental
concerns.
Some multilateral environmental agreements, such as those dealing with endan-
gered species and ozone-depleting chemicals, include trade restrictions aimed at
nonsignatories that do not comply with the environmental protection measures
agreed to by the signatories. An example is the Montreal Protocol's ban on imports
from nonsignatory nations of products containing CFCs or manufactured by pro-
cesses using CFCs.26 The legality under the GATT of such trade restrictions
is not settled. A broad multilateral consensus on standards should, however,
strengthen their legitimacy by easing concerns that a trade restriction imposed in
the name of the environment is in fact a protectionist measure. Moreover, nations
that agree to common measures, such as the phaseout of CFCs, in order to protect
the global commons have strong claims to defend themselves from competition
by free-riders.
Developing countries have demanded financial and technology assistance from
developed countries as a condition to joining multilateral agreements on process
standards, citing their relative poverty and the dominant responsibility of devel-
oped countries for past and present environmental degradation. Particularly where
protection of the global commons or preservation of biodiversity within devel-
oping countries is at stake, assistance may be in the developed countries' self
interest as well as equitably appropriate. A multilateral process agreement could
specifically provide for such assistance; the Montreal Protocol and the Climate
Change Convention27 exemplify this approach. Assistance could also be provided
through other bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
V. The NAFTA's Resolution of Trade and Environment Issues
The provisions in the NAFTA that address the trade and environment issues
analyzed above go further in addressing environmental issues than any previous
trade agreement. However, the circumstances of the NAFTA present special
challenges to the effort to reconcile trade and environmental objectives. The
joinder of a developing country such as Mexico with two developed countries with
26. The Montreal Protocol is a mixed product/process agreement, aimed in part at manufacturing
processes and in part at products that release ozone-depleting substances.
27. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 899 (1992).
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strong environmental constituencies presents potentially sharp conflicts between
trade and environmental objectives. The problem of transboundary pollution
between countries sharing long common borders presents further complications.
To the extent that the NAFTA's approach succeeds in the face of these challenges,
it is likely to be emulated in other free trade agreements, including GATT.
Moreover, article 2005 of the NAFTA provides for accession by other countries.
Chile has already indicated interest in joining the NAFTA, which could evolve
into a Western Hemisphere common market.
The NAFTA sets a new precedent by explicitly affirming in the preamble and
elsewhere that trade liberalization and accompanying economic development must
be consistent with sustainable development and other environmental goals and
stating that the parties' resolve to develop further environmental laws and enforce-
ment. The agreement, however, does not include environmental protection among
its designated objectives. The NAFTA contains detailed provisions regarding the
harmonization of product standards and sanitary and phytosanitary standards
relating to pests, diseases, and of food, beverage, and feedstock risks.
The provisions concerning general product standards in chapter 9 of the
NAFTA represent a deft effort by lawyers and diplomats to reconcile the goal of
harmonization with U.S. environmentalist opposition to any relaxation of U.S.
standards. The provisions affirm a goal of joint work to enhance the level of
protection. The parties agree "to the greatest extent practicable" to make their
standards compatible "[w]ithout reducing the level of safety or of protection., 28
But each party may "establish the levels of protection that it considers appro-
priate" in accordance with "risk assessment procedures" and exclude imports
that fail to meet standards embodying those protection levels.29 If risk assessment
information is incomplete, a party may adopt a provisional technical regulation
but within a reasonable period after sufficient risk information is presented, the
party shall, where appropriate, revise its regulation. Each party shall base its
standards on international standards already in force or whose adoption is immi-
nent, unless these standards are not appropriate to its geographic, climatic, techno-
logical, or infrastructural circumstances, or fail to secure the level of protection
that the party deems appropriate. Conformance to international standards, how-
ever, establishes a presumption that a party's standard is nondiscriminatory and
does not pose unnecessary obstacles to trade. From the U.S. environmentalist
perspective, the question is the extent to which these provisions threaten U.S.
28. North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA] art. 906(2). All references to
the NAFTA are to the Oct. 7, 1992, draft.
29. The NAFTA does not adopt the provision in the draft Uruguay Round, which provides that
standards "shall not be more restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective." GATT, Draft
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT
Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA Dec. 20, 1991, § 6, Standards Code, art. 2.2. This provision invites means-
ends review that could invalidate a standard because the adverse effects on trade attributable to its
design are thought to outweigh the environmental benefits.
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standards that are more stringent than applicable international standards and can-
not be justified by reference to widely accepted risk assessment principles. The
provisions could, for example, cast doubt on the enforceability against Mexican
imports of the Delaney Amendment, which prohibits any detectable residue in
food of any carcinogenic substance.
The provisions relating to sanitary and phytosanitary standards in chapter 7B
of the NAFTA are similar to those for general product standards, but impose
somewhat more restrictive conditions on the use of such standards to limit trade.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures "must be 'necessary' for the protection of
human, animal, or plant life, . . . 'necessary' to achieve the [relevant] level of
protection, ... 'based on scientific principles,' and 'not maintained where there
is no longer a scientific basis,' " for the measure.30
The NAFTA provisions relating to sanitary and phytosanitary standards and
other product standards do not authorize trade restrictions against products be-
cause of the adverse environmental effect of their production processes. 3 The
NAFTA addresses the question of process standards only indirectly, in the provi-
sions in article 1114 of the agreement dealing with investment. These provisions
recognize the right of the parties to impose environmental requirements such as
environmental impact assessment procedures on new investments. They also state
that it is "inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health,
safety, or environmental measures." The latter statement, while largely preca-
tory, is nonetheless a precedent-setting acknowledgment of "pollution-haven"
concerns in the context of a trade agreement. However, no NAFTA provisions
deal with harmonization of process standards; the principle of "harmonization
upward" found in the NAFTA provisions dealing with sanitary and phytosanitary
and other product standards is notably absent. Nor are there provisions dealing
with enforcement or transboundary pollution.
The provisions for dispute resolution in chapter 20 of the NAFTA provide for
panel adjudicatory procedures similar to those established under the GATT and
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Under the NAFTA, however, the party
challenging an environmentally related trade restriction carries the burden of
establishing its inconsistency with the NAFTA. Under the GATT the party impos-
ing such restrictions has the burden. The NAFTA also provides that where a trade
dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the GATT as well as the NAFTA, the party
30. Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA: An Analysis of Its Environmental Provisions, 23 ENVTL. L. REp.
10,067, 10,068 (1993). The provisions in the NAFTA are not, however, as restrictive as the sanitary
and phytosanitary provisions in the Uruguay Round.
31. For example, product-related standards are defined as "rules, guidelines, or characteristics
for products, or related processes and production methods." NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 915(1).
The reference to "related processes or production methods" (emphasis added) is designed to encom-
pass the common practice of ensuring the quality of meat, drugs, and other products by inspection
of their production processes. It is not meant to include the environmental effects of the processes
themselves.
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whose environmental restrictions are challenged can, in most instances, choose
to have it adjudicated by a GATT panel or a NAFTA panel; the latter is expected
to be more sympathetic to environmental concerns. The NAFTA also breaks new
ground in providing that a panel may" seek information and technical advice from
any person or body that it deems appropriate," but only with the agreement of
the parties.32 As in the case of the GATT, panel proceedings are confidential.
These features of the dispute resolution process disappoint environmentalists, who
favor decisional transparency and nongovernmental organization participation as
of right.
The NAFTA, however, establishes committees on sanitary and phytosanitary
standards and on general product standards. It charges these committees with
facilitating the process of harmonizing standards and dealing with disputes before
the convening of an adjudicatory panel. The NAFTA breaks new ground by
explicitly authorizing such committees to consult with outside scientists, technical
experts, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, including specifi-
cally "standardizing bodies' 33 but also presumably environmental groups. This
inclusive process is designed to promote consensus solutions to trade-environment
conflicts. There are also provisions requiring parties to provide notice of new
or modified product regulatory measures and a central inquiry point to answer
questions regarding them.
Article 104 of the NAFTA addresses the relation between its provisions and
the trade provisions of certain multilateral environmental agreements. It affirms
that the parties' obligations under CITES, the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Con-
vention, and certain implementing agreements override the provisions of the
NAFTA, thus validating the trade restrictions imposed by those agreements. 34 If
future international environmental agreements include trade sanctions, the
NAFTA parties must presumably agree unanimously that they would override the
NAFTA. One issue that the NAFTA does not fully address is the extent to
which the NAFTA provisions concerning product standards and sanitary and
phytosanitary standards might invalidate state or provincial standards that are
more stringent than national standards. The prospect that the NAFTA would
preempt more stringent U.S. state standards is a major concern of environmental-
ists. 31
The question of process standards and their enforcement will be further
addressed through side agreements that will be negotiated between the signatory
32. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 2014.
33. Id. art. 913(4)(a)(i).
34. Article 104 provides that if a party has several available means for complying with these
agreements, it must choose the alternative least inconsistent with the NAFTA.
35. See Patti Goldman, The Legal Effect of Trade Agreements on Domestic Health and Environ-
mental Regulations, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11 (1992); Robert L. Heckart & Tira Harpaz, Critics
Ask if the NAFTA is "Green" Enough, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 17; Charnovitz, supra note
30, at 10,069-70.
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nations and presented to Congress at the same time as the implementing legislation
for the NAFTA. Congress will hold hearings and may insist on add-ons to the
NAFTA or to the side agreements. As of this writing it appears unlikely that the
NAFTA text will be amended, but the content of the implementing legislation and
the side agreements will be crucial in the Congress' decision whether to approve
the NAFTA.
One issue that will be addressed through the side agreements is the further
strengthening of existing efforts to deal with transboundary pollution, hazardous
waste, and other environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexico border,36 al-
though the NAFTA will probably have the effect of shifting new development
from the maquiladora region to other parts of Mexico. A second agenda item is
the creation of a North American Commission on the Environment to compile
and analyze information about environmental conditions, receive complaints re-
garding environmental problems, and seek to promote remedial measures. Among
the issues to be addressed are the Commission's governance structure, the role
of nongovernmental organizations, the Commission's relation to the NAFTA
governance structure and dispute resolution process,37 its role in the development
of environmentally related amendments to the NAFTA, and the extent of its
authority, particularly in relation to environmental enforcement. A third topic is
strengthening environmental standards and enforcement in Mexico. The means
proposed include extension of existing cooperative efforts to strengthen Mexico's
enforcement capabilities; maintenance of duties on Mexican imports to fund such
efforts; securing Mexico's commitment to toxic waste cleanup and to higher
process standards, such as a requirement that all new plants install the best avail-
able pollution control technology; and "snap back" U.S. tariffs against Mexican
imports that would revive if Mexico failed to enforce environmental standards.
While it is unlikely that the more ambitious of these provisions will be adopted,
the agenda bespeaks the considerable success of environmental groups in their
efforts to ensure that trade liberalization measures address environmental con-
cerns.
VI. Conclusion
While the NAFTA has yet to be finally approved, its evolution to date reflects
considerable progress in accommodating environmental and trade concerns. The
detailed provisions concerning product and sanitary and phytosanitary standards
36. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANO
Y ECOLOGIA, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA (FIRST
STAGE, 1992-1994) (1992).
37. For example, it has been proposed that the Commission participate in the resolution of the
NAFTA trade disputes involving environmental issues by developing a roster of environmental experts
that would serve on the NAFTA tribunals and as amicus curiae to such tribunals. See STEWART
HUDSON & RODRIGO PRUDENCIO, THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND
OTHER SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS: PART II OF THE NAFTA PACKAGE (1993).
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and the effort to promote their harmonization represent an important forward step
in addressing environmental concerns in trade agreements. The NAFTA indicates
that process standards will continue to be addressed through separate agreements.
This approach may be appropriate because progress in harmonizing process stan-
dards is likely to be incremental rather than comprehensive, addressing particular
types of pollution and other problems on a step-by-step basis. The NAFTA's
affirmation of trade restrictions to enforce multilateral environmental agreements
like the CITES and the Montreal Protocol are an important precedent in a trade
liberalizing agreement. The dispute resolution procedures represent a modest step
forward from a diplomatic model to a more transparent judicial model. If the
NAFTA is approved, both government negotiators and environmental groups will
have cause for satisfaction.
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